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Robert W. Carmichael* Statutory Liens in the Atlantic
Canada Offshore Area
This article will examine statutory and common law liens in relation to assets
used in oil and gas exploration and production in areas offshore Nova Scotia
and Newfoundland and Labrador It considers the applicable constitutional
regime, the maritime law and the interrelationship between maritime law,
federal law, and provincial law.
Dans cet article, l'auteur examine les privileges pr6vus par la loi et en com-
mon law sur les biens utilis~s pour I'exploration p6troliere et la production
d'hydrocarbures au large de la Nouvelle-Ecosse et de Terre-Neuve-et-
Labrador II considere le r6gime constitutionnel applicable, le droit maritime
et les rapports mutuels entre le droit maritime, les lois f6d6rales et les lois
provinciales.
* Robert Carmichael is a partner in the Halifax office of Cox Hanson O'Reilly Matheson.
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Introduction
This article examines statutory and common law liens in relation to
assets used in oil and gas exploration and production in areas offshore
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador. Those areas where oil and
gas activity is now occurring in Atlantic Canada lie beyond the twelve
mile limit in areas outside of the territorial boundaries of Canada or any
province. The federal government of Canada undoubtedly has the power
to extend its laws beyond its territorial boundaries into areas offshore but
there are limits on the extent to which provincial governments can enact
laws that extend beyond provincial boundaries. The offshore areas on
the continental shelf are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government. In order for provincial laws to apply, there must be federal
legislation extending the application of provincial law to the offshore.
However there are constitutional issues that arise when the federal gov-
ernment purports to delegate or transfer legislative powers to a provincial
government in relation to matters that, under the Constitution Act, 1867,1
are exclusively within federal jurisdiction such as the offshore areas on the
continental shelf and where the provincial legislature does not, indepen-
dent of the delegation, have legislative authority.
Constitutional issues aside, the extent to which a provincial law will
apply to assets used in offshore oil and gas exploration and production is
complicated by the fact that most of those types of assets would constitute
"ships" as understood under maritime law. This means that most offshore
assets will be subject to Canadian maritime law. Canadian maritime law
is a body of federal law that is uniform across the country. It is not, and
does not encompass provincial law. In fact, the circumstances under which
provincial law will be applied, even incidentally, in a maritime context are
very limited. As a result, in most circumstances there will be little or no
room for the application of provincial legislation under which statutory
liens are created to assets used in offshore oil and gas exploration and
production.
I. The Constitutional Legal Regime
A basic understanding of the legal regime that applies to areas in the
offshore is an essential starting point. It is fundamentally different than the
regime that applies onshore in Canada.
I. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [Constitution Act, 1867].
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1. Federal Extra-Territorial Powers
The areas in which offshore oil and gas drilling, exploration and develop-
ment are now occurring in the Atlantic region are outside the territorial
boundaries of Canada. Under international law, the boundary of Canada,
as a coastal state, extends twelve miles beyond the low water mark. The
areas offshore on the continental shelf beyond the twelve-mile limit are
not considered to be within the territorial boundaries of Canada or any
province. This point was made in two landmark decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Canada. In Reference re: Ownership of Off Shore Mineral
Rights of British Columbia, the Supreme Court said that the "continental
shelf is outside the boundaries of British Columbia."' In Reference re:
Seabed and Subsoil of Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the offshore areas on the continental shelf
are not within the boundaries of Canada or any province.
At international law, then, the continental shelf off Newfoundland is out-
side the territory of the nation state of Canada. Since, as a matter of mu-
nicipal law, neither Canada nor Newfoundland purports to claim anything
more than international law recognizes, we are here concerned with an
area outside the boundaries of either Newfoundland or Canada.3
Although the areas offshore on the continental shelf are not within the
boundaries of Canada, this country does have the right under international
law to extend its domestic laws to the offshore areas up to the 200-mile
limit. The jurisdiction to do so is within the exclusive powers of the federal
government.4
The authority of the Parliament of Canada to enact legislation
with extraterritorial effect was affirmed in Croft v. Dunphy.5 That case
considered a provision in the federal Customs Act which autho-
rized Customs officials to seize ships carrying goods for which
customs and duties were exigible in areas beyond the limit of Canada's
territorial seas. The Privy Council held that the Federal Parliament had
authority to enact laws which applied in areas beyond Canada's boundaries
as recognized under international law. According to Hogg, Constitutional
2. [1967] S.C.R. 792 at para. 98 [British Columbia Reference Case].
3. [ 1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 at 97 [Newfoundland Reference Case].
4. See British Columbia Reference Case, supra note 2 and Newfoundland Reference case, supra
note 3.
5. Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156 (P.C.). See also, the Statute of Westminister, 1931 (U.K.), 22
& 23 Geo. V., c. 4, which provided in section 3: "It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament
of a Dominion has full power to make laws having extraterritorial operation."
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Law of Canada,6 it is "beyond question" that the federal government has
extraterritorial powers. Indeed, those powers have been exercised repeat-
edly in areas such as immigration, shipping, fishing, the environment and
taxation.
2. Provincial Territorial Limits
The extraterritorial powers of the provinces of Canada are clearly more
limited. It is generally recognized that the territorial limits of coastal
provinces like Nova Scotia and Newfoundland end at the low water mark
with the exception of inland waterways like bays and harbours which
are ordinarily considered to be within the boundaries of the provinces.7
Halifax Harbour, for instance, would be such an inland waterway which
would lie within the territorial boundaries of Nova Scotia. Similarly, St.
John's Harbour would be within the territory of Newfoundland and Labra-
dor. Offshore areas in the territorial seas and beyond the territorial seas, on
the continental shelf, are outside the boundaries of the provinces.
In the British Columbia Reference Case,8 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the Province of British Columbia lacked legislative jurisdiction
in areas on the continental shelf on the west coast of Canada:
As with territorial sea, so with the continental shelf. There are two
reasons why British Columbia lacks the right to explore and exploit and
lacks legislative jurisdiction:
(1) The continental shelf is outside the boundaries of British Columbia,
and
(2) Canada is the sovereign state which will be recognized by interna-
tional law as having the rights stated in the Convention of 1958, and it is
Canada, not the province of British Columbia, that will have to answer the
claims of other members of the international community for breach of the
obligations and responsibilities imposed by the Convention.
There is no historical, legal or constitutional basis upon which the prov-
ince of British Columbia could claim the right to explore and exploit or
claim legislative jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf.9
6. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,
1997).
7. Ibid. at 325.
8. Supra note 2 at 821.
9. Supra note 2 at para. 98-99.
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The limitations on provincial authority in offshore areas were reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Newfoundland Reference Case.'
There the Supreme Court was asked whether Canada or Newfoundland
had the legislative jurisdiction to make laws in relation to the exploitation
of natural resources on the continental shelf. In an attempt to distinguish
the earlier British Columbia decision, Newfoundland argued that it had a
different historical and constitutional position than British Columbia. The
Court rejected the argument, stating that the right to explore and exploit
the resources of the continental shelf were rights granted to Canada by
international law as a coastal state. Newfoundland's legislative compe-
tence was confined to its provincial boundaries, like all other Canadian
provinces." It was the Court's view that the continental shelf was out-
side Newfoundland's boundaries (and the boundaries of Canada for that
matter) and hence could not fall within the scope of any of the provin-
cial powers contained in s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Legislative
jurisdiction rested with Canada under its residual peace, order, and good
government powers.
A province cannot make laws which extend beyond its own bound-
aries. Most parts of the continental shelf off British Columbia 2 and
Newfoundland have been determined to be outside the geographic bound-
aries of those provinces and therefore outside of the sphere of their legisla-
tive jurisdiction. While it is true that the Supreme Court has never specifi-
cally ruled on Nova Scotia's rights in respect of the continental shelf, in
the Newfoundland Reference Case the Supreme Court stated unequivo-
cally that continental shelf rights are "extraterritorial" rights 3 and that the
"first nine Canadian Provinces... never gained extraterritorial legislative
competence...."" In the Supreme Court's assessment, it made no differ-
ence as to when the provinces joined Confederation.
3. Intergovernmental Delegation of Powers
It is established that the relevant areas of the Atlantic offshore are beyond
the legislative reach of the provincial governments. The question then
arises whether the federal government, which does have extraterritorial
authority over those areas, can confer authority on the provinces.
10. Supra note 3.
11. Supra note 3 at 127-128.
12. See Reference re Ownership of Bed of Straight of Georgia and Related areas, (1976), 1 B.C.L.R.
97.
13. Supra note 3 at 99.
14. Supra note 3 at 103.
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Inter-delegation among legislative bodies is prohibited. In Attorney-
General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney General of Canada,5 the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down, as unconstitutional, a law enacted by the
province of Nova Scotia to give effect to a proposed national unemploy-
ment insurance program whereby the provinces would delegate to the
federal Parliament power to make laws in relation to matters of employ-
ment, which is a power within the jurisdiction of the provinces under s. 92
of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Administrative inter-delegation is not prohibited. In Prince Edward
Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc., 6 the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the federal Agriculture Products Marketing Act 7
which gave the federal cabinet authority to prescribe regulations by which
provincial marketing boards could be delegated the power to regulate
inter-provincial trade in agriculture products. As Hogg states:
What is prohibited is the inter-delegation of any kind of power, including
administrative power, to a primary law-making body - the Parliament
or a Legislature. What is permitted is the inter-delegation of any kind of
power, including "legislative" power, to a body or official other than a
primary law-making body. 8
One way that the inter-delegation prohibition may be avoided is through
the technique of incorporation by one legislative body of the laws of
another jurisdiction by reference. Instead of adopting the law in a particu-
lar statute of another jurisdiction by restating all of the provisions of the
statute verbatim, a legislative body can, for convenience, simply adopt the
statute of the other jurisdiction by appropriate reference to it. No particu-
lar constitutional difficulty arises if the subject matter of the statute being
adopted is within the legislative competence of the adopting legislative
body and the statute of the other jurisdiction is adopted as it stood on a
particular date. A more difficult situation arises if the other jurisdiction's
statute is adopted as it may be amended from time to time. The poten-
tial problem, in that case, is that the legislative body which is adopting
the statute of another jurisdiction is essentially relinquishing legislative
authority to the other jurisdiction as regards amending the adopted legisla-
tion in the future.
15. A.G. of NS v. A.G. of Canada, [1951] S.C.R. 31 [Nova Scotia Inter-delegation case].
16. [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392.
17. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-6.
18. Hogg, supra note 6 at 365 footnote 81.
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The question whether, in light of the prohibition on inter-delegation
among legislative bodies, the federal Parliament can delegate directly to
a provincial legislature the authority to enact laws with extraterritorial
operation which would apply in the offshore areas (an exclusive power of
the federal Parliament) has never been tested. The Supreme Court has said
that "...it is constitutionally permissible for a validly enacted provincial
statute of general application to affect matters coming within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Parliament."' 9 The type of provincial legislation (such as
labour and employment, occupational health and safety and personal prop-
erty security legislation) that could possibly be extended to offshore areas
through federal legislation would in most cases involve matters which, on
their face, would appear to be within provincial competence and authority
as matters of property and civil rights.
The problem, if there is one, is that the jurisdiction of the provinces
in respect of matters of property and civil rights under section 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 is explicitly limited to matters of property and civil
rights "in the Province."2 ° Since, as we have seen, the offshore areas are
not within the boundaries of any province, the provinces would not have
independent jurisdictional authority to enact laws, even in relation to
matters of property and civil rights, that would apply in offshore areas
beyond the boundaries of the Province. Therefore if a federal statute
purported to extend the application of a provincial statute to the offshore,
would not the effect of this be to transfer (delegate) to the provincial legis-
lature the power to enact, amend, and repeal laws in respect of a matter for
which the province did not possess legislative competency independently
of the purported delegation?
This is all well and good if the provincial law that is adopted remains
static. However if it happens that the provincial statute is to be amended by
the provincial legislature, would not the federal Parliament be effectively
delegating to the provincial legislature legislative power with respect to
the federally-adopted provincial statute?
A similar issue arose in Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport
Board2' which considered the validity of the federal Motor Vehicle Trans-
port Act, 1987.22 The statute conferred on provincial transport boards the
authority to license inter-provincial carriers in the same manner as local
carriers. Essentially the provincial boards were directed to apply provin-
19. Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at para. 81 [Ordon Estate].
20. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(13). See also Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 6 at
571.
21. [1968] S.C.R. 569 [Coughlin].
22. R.S.C. 1985, c. 29 (3rd Supp.).
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cial laws, "as they existed from time to time," in respect of licensing inter-
provincial carriers - a matter under federal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court held that the federal statute was valid.
In Coughlin, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in R. v. Glibbery.23 In that case, the Court upheld a provision
of the Government Property Traffic Regulations24 which prohibited the
operation of vehicles on federal property "except in accordance with the
laws of the province as existing from time to time." This decision has led
some commentators to conclude that it is now "settled" that one level of
government in Canada can adopt the future legislation of another through
the technique of incorporation by reference. 5
Hogg points out that there was an important difference between the
Coughlin and Nova Scotia Inter-delegation cases.
The provincial legislation which was incorporated by reference in Cough-
lin was (or would be in the future) enacted by the provincial Legislature
within its competence and for its own purposes, namely, to regulate intra-
provincial carriers; the provincial legislation was not created just for the
federal purpose of regulating extra provincial carriers.... In effect, what is
being insisted upon is that the legislation which is incorporated by refer-
ence should have a validity and significance independent of the scheme of
delegation. This element was present in Coughlin, because the provincial
transportation laws were enacted within provincial competence to regu-
late intraprovincial carriers. This being so, they could also be "borrowed"
by the federal Parliament to regulate interprovincial carriers. In Nova
Scotia Inter-delegation, by contrast, it was contemplated that the legisla-
tive bodies to which powers were delegated would each enact laws which
would apart from the delegation be outside their competence, and which
were solely for the purpose of carrying out the pension plan scheme. 26
According to La Forest, the technique of incorporating by reference the
statutes of another level of government, even as amended from time
to time, has allowed the rule against inter-delegation to be avoided in
large measure in Canada such that delegation "...of legislative power in
Canada, though still a source of fascination for constitution scholars, is not
today a 'live subject'." 27
23. [1963] 1 O.R. 232 (Ont. C.A.).
24. C.R.C., c. 887.
25. Gerard V. La Forest, "Delegation of Legislative Power in Canada" (1975) 21 McGill L. J. 131 at
139. See also Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 5th ed. (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 1986) vol. 1
at 41-46.
26. Hogg, supra note 6 at 368-369.
27. La Forest, supra note 25 at 131.
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4. Provincial Laws Applicable in the Offshore
Constitutional issues aside, in order for any particular domestic law of
Canada to apply in the offshore area, there must be specific legislation
by which that law is made to apply in the offshore. This typically occurs
in one of two ways. The first is that a particular statute may contain an
express provision by which the legislation is stated to apply to the
offshore. Secondly, laws of Canada or subject to issues of constitutional
validity, any province, can be made to apply to the offshore through regu-
lations prescribed under the Oceans Act.28
Under the Oceans Act, federal laws apply on or under any marine
installation or structure that is attached or anchored to the continental shelf
in connection with the exploration of the shelf or the production of min-
erals or other non-living resources. However the Act also provides that,
where prescribed by regulation, provincial laws may apply to any such
marine installations or structures as well as to areas within the territorial
sea of Canada up to twelve miles beyond the low water mark.
While Nova Scotia has unilaterally purported to extend some of its
laws to the offshore area (like the Nova Scotia Personal Property Security
Act),29 those efforts have, at best, questionable legal effect given the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court in the Newfoundland and British Columbia
offshore reference cases. In order for any provincial law to apply offshore
it must, at least, be supported by federal legislation.
Very little has been done by the federal government to extend any
provincial laws to the offshore. To date, no regulations have been
prescribed pursuant to the Oceans Act to extend any provincial laws of
Nova Scotia or Newfoundland to the offshore areas. The only effort so
far to extend any provincial laws to the offshore is under the Hibernia
Development Project Act,30 which came into force on November 9, 1999.
It enables the extension of certain federal as well as provincial legislation
to the Newfoundland offshore area,3' including, of note, federal laws relat-
ing to banking, bills of exchange, promissory notes, interest, bankruptcy
and insolvency and the regulation of trade and commerce, and provincial
laws relating to security interests, including laws in relation to the enforce-
ment of rights.
The Hibernia Development Project Offshore Application Regulations32
28. S.C. 1996, c. 31 [Oceans Act].
29. R.S.N.S. 1995-1996, c. 13.
30. S.C. 1990, c. 41.
31. Ibid., ss. 7-10.
32. S.O.R./90-774.
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made pursuant to subsections 7(1) and 8(1) of the Hibernia Development
Project Act,33 extend the federal Bank Act,34 Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act,3 5 Bills of Exchange Act36 and Interest Act37 to the Newfoundland
offshore area.38 The regulations also extend Newfoundland's Assignment
of Book Debts Act,39 Bills of Sale Act,' Conditional Sales Act,4 and Reg-
istration of Deeds Act 2 to the offshore area. Notably, Newfoundland's
Personal Property Security Act,43 which replaces its Assignment of Book
Debts Act,an Bills of Sale Act45 and Conditional Sales Act,46 has not yet
been extended to the offshore area. It is also particularly relevant to note
here that the provincial labour standards and workers compensation
legislation of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, which pro-
vide for the creation of certain statutory liens, have not been extended to
the offshore areas by federal legislation. Indeed no other provincial laws
of either of the two provinces have been extended to the offshore areas.
II. The Maritime Law Regime
1. Interrelationship of Maritime Law and Provincial Law
In a series of cases dating back to the mid 1980s, the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that Canadian maritime law is a body of federal law deal-
ing with matters of navigation and shipping. If the subject matter of a
dispute is "integrally connected" to maritime matters then the dispute will
be dealt with through the application of maritime law. Provincial law will
not apply.
One of the leading Supreme Court cases which defined the scope and
nature of Canadian maritime law was International Terminal Operators
Limited v. Miida Electronics Inc. (1986).4" In that case, Miida Electronics
33. Supra note 30.
34. S.C. 1991, c. 46.
35. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
36. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4.
37. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-15.
38. Supra note 32, Schedule I.
39. R.S.N. 1970, c. 15.
40. R.S.N. 1970, c. 21.
41. S.N. 1955, c. 62.
42. R.S.N. 1990, c. R-10.
43. S.N. 1998, c. P-7.1.
44. Supra note 39.
45. Supra note 40.
46. Supra note41.
47. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 [ITO].
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had entered a contract with Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., a marine carrier, to
ship a cargo of electronic calculators from Japan to Montreal. The cargo
was picked up in Montreal by ITO, a stevedoring company and terminal
operator. Prior to delivery, the goods were stolen from a shed where they
were being temporarily stored. Miida sued Mitsui and ITO in Federal
Court. One of the primary issues was whether maritime law applied to
give the Federal Court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that Canadian
maritime law was applicable. The Court went on to describe the nature
of Canadian maritime law and its interrelationship with provincial law.
Maritime law was described by the Court as "a body of federal law deal-
ing with all claims in respect of maritime and admiralty matters. '48 How-
ever the Court was cognizant of the possibility of the encroachment of
maritime law into matters that are in "pith and substance" matters of
property and civil rights and as such within exclusive provincial jurisdic-
tion; Justice McIntyre indicated that a threshold test had to be met before
maritime law would be applied:
It is important, therefore, to establish that the subject-matter under
consideration in any case is so integrally connected to maritime
matters as to be legitimate Canadian maritime law within federal legislative
competence.
49
It follows then, that if the test is satisfied, maritime law applies and provin-
cial law is not a component of maritime law. In considering the scope and
nature of Canadian maritime law, McIntyre J. stated:
It is my view as set out above, that Canadian maritime law is a body of
federal law encompassing the common law principles of tort, contract and
bailment. I am also of the opinion that Canadian maritime law is uniform
throughout Canada, a view also expressed by Le Dain J. in the Court of
Appeal who applied the common law principles of bailment to resolve
Miida's claim against ITO. Canadian maritime law is that body of law
defined in s.2 of the Federal Court Act. That law was the maritime law of
England as it has been incorporated into Canadian law and it is not the law
of any province of Canada. 50
The ITO case was followed by Whitbread v. Walley.5' There the Supreme
Court of Canada again addressed the scope of Canadian maritime law.
48. Ibid. at 774.
49. Ibid. at para. 21.
50. Ibid. at para. 31-32.
51. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273 [Whitbreadl.
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The case was a personal injury claim arising from injuries sustained when
a 32-foot boat registered as a "ship" under the Canada Shipping Act52 ran
aground in Vancouver Harbour. The plaintiff became a quadriplegic and
sued Walley, the person in control of the boat at the time of the accident.
In defence, Walley denied negligence and applied for a declaration that he
was entitled to limit his liability under sections 647 and 649 of the Canada
Shipping Act. La Forest J., writing for the Court, held that the federal limi-
tation of liability provisions applied even though no commercial shipping
was involved in the case. The Court held that Canadian maritime law gov-
erned tort claims resulting from the navigation of vessels and stressed the
need in this regard for uniformity of maritime law across the country - a
concept which leaves little room within maritime law for the application of
provincial laws, which of course may vary from province to province.53
Not only does federal maritime law apply to matters involving torts,
it also applies to matters of contract that are "integrally connected" to a
maritime matter. In Monk Corp. v. Island Fertilizers Ltd.,54 the Supreme
Court of Canada considered the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in the
context of a contract for the supply of products to be imported by a ship.
Monk Corp. contracted with Island Fertilizers for the supply of imported
fertilizer for discharge at Canadian ports. Following its delivery by ship,
Monk Corp. claimed at the Federal Court for excess product delivered,
demurrage and rental of shore discharge cranes. A majority of the Federal
Court of Appeal held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction only with re-
spect to the claim relating to demurrage. A majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada disagreed. Iacobucci J. said that the obligations of delivery and
discharge in the case were "integrally connected" with maritime activities
and as such were governed by federal maritime law. He said:
parties can assume maritime obligations governed by maritime law even
though they may not formally be parties to a charter-party or even a
contract of carriage by sea. What is important for purposes of maritime
law jurisdiction is that their claim be integrally connected with maritime
matters.55
Clearly a dispute which is integrally connected to a maritime matter must
be resolved through the application of maritime law principles. But is
52. R.S.C. 1985, c. 5-9 [Canada Shipping Act].
53. Supra note 51 at paras. 27-28.
54. [1991] 1 S.C.R. 779 [Monk].
55. Ibid. at para. 44.
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there any room for the "incidental" application of provincial laws in a
matter that is otherwise governed by maritime law?
This is the question that came before the Supreme Court in Ordon
Estate v. Grail.56 That case involved appeals and cross-appeals arising
out of four negligence actions that were commenced in the Ontario Court
(General Division) in relation to two boating accidents that occurred on
navigable waters within Ontario. lacobucci J. and Major J., on behalf of
the Court, described the constitutional issue raised by the facts in the case
as "whether a validly enacted provincial statute of general application may
be applied to deal with incidental aspects of a maritime negligence claim
that is otherwise governed entirely by Federal maritime law." The Court
held:
This Court's recent maritime law jurisprudence makes clear that
Canadian maritime law is a body of federal law, uniform across the
country, within which there is no room for the application of provincial
statutes. What the case law does not explicitly address, however, is
whether and when it is contrary to the division of powers as set out in
the Constitution Act, 1867 for provincial statutes of general application
to apply on their own terms as provincial law within a factual context
which is otherwise governed by federal maritime law. The plaintiffs in
these appeals submit that, although provincial statutes are not usually ap-
plicable to resolve maritime matters, they should nevertheless be applied
as incidentally necessary to fill gaps which may exist in federal maritime
negligence law.57
The Court conceded that "at least until 1976 ... provincial statutes could
be invoked to determine important issues arising incidentally as part of a
maritime negligence claim," but that a "reorientation" had since occurred
in the Court's views with respect to the nature and scope of maritime law.58
The Court stated that maritime law in Canada should now be considered
a "comprehensive" body of federal law that is "uniform" across Canada.
The Court summarized the general principles as follows:
1. "Canadian maritime law" as defined in s. 2 of the Federal Court Act is a
comprehensive body of federal law dealing with all claims in respect of
maritime and admiralty matters. The scope of Canadian maritime law is
not limited by the scope of English admiralty law at the time of its adop-
tion into Canadian law in 1934. Rather, the word "maritime" is to be
56. Supra note 19.
57. Supra note 19 at para. 68.
58. Supra note 19 at paras. 70-7 1.
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interpreted within the modern context of commerce and shipping and the
ambit of Canadian maritime law should be considered limited only to the
constitutional division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867. The test
for determining whether a subject matter under consideration is within
maritime law requires a finding that the subject matter is so integrally
connected to maritime matters as to be legitimate Canadian maritime law
within federal competence: ITO, supra, at p. 774; Monk Corp., supra, at
p. 795.
2. Canadian maritime law is uniform throughout Canada, and it is not the
law of any province of Canada. All of its principles constitute federal law
and not an incidental application of provincial law: ITO, supra, at pp. 779,
782; Chartwell, supra, at p. 696.
3. The substantive content of Canadian maritime law is to be determined by
reference to its heritage. It includes, but is not limited to, the body of law
administered in England by the High Court on its Admiralty side in 1934,
as that body of law has been amended by the Canadian Parliament and as
it has developed by judicial precedent to date; ITO, supra, at pp. 771,776;
Chartwell, supra, at pp. 695-96.
4. English admiralty law as incorporated into Canadian law in 1934 was an
amalgam of principles deriving in large part from both the common law
and the civilian tradition. It was composed of both the specialized rules
and principles of admiralty, and the rules and principles adopted from
the common law and applied in admiralty cases .... ITO, supra at p. 776;
Chartwell, supra at pp. 695-97.
5. The nature of navigation and shipping activities as they are practiced in
Canada makes a uniform maritime law a practical necessity .... Whitbread,
supra, at pp. 1294-95; Bow Valley Husky, supra, at pp. 1259-60.
6. In those instances where Parliament has not passed legislation dealing
with a maritime matter, the inherited non-statutory principles embod-
ied in Canadian maritime law as developed by Canadian courts remain
applicable, and resort should be had to these principles before considering
whether to apply provincial law to resolve an issue in a maritime action:
ITO, supra, at pp. 781-82; Bow Valley Husky, supra, at p. 1260.
7. Canadian maritime law is not static or frozen. The general principles
established by this Court with respect to judicial reform of the law applied
to the reform of Canadian maritime law, allowing development in the law
where the appropriate criteria are met. 9
59. Supra note 19 at para. 71.
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The Court enunciated a four-step test to resolve the issue of whether and
when it is constitutionally permissible for provincial statutes to be applied
in the context of maritime law negligence claims:
Step One: Identifying the Matter at Issue - This involves a determi-
nation as to whether the matter falls within the scope of maritime law.
Essentially, the question is whether the matter is "integrally connected"
to a maritime matter - the point being that if the matter is not integrally
connected to a maritime matter then maritime law does not apply and the
issue of a potential conflict with a provincial law would not arise.
Step Two: Reviewing Maritime Law Sources - This step requires the
Court to consider all sources of maritime law to determine whether the
subject matter of the provincial law is addressed by some principle of
maritime law such that the necessity to apply the provincial law becomes
a moot point.
Step Three: Considering the Possibility of Reform - This step requires
the Court to consider whether maritime law principles should be reformed
by the Court to take into account the matter which is the subject of the
provincial law. If the matter remains unresolved through steps one through
three, then it becomes necessary to consider the constitutional question as
to whether the provincial law can be applied in the context of a maritime
law matter.
Step Four: Constitutional Analysis - The Supreme Court explained the
fourth step in the following terms:
The fourth step, if it is required, consists of a constitutional analysis of
whether a particular provincial statutory provision is applicable within
the context of a maritime law claim. The applicability of provincial law
should be evaluated only where the issue cannot be resolved on non-con-
stitutional grounds as set out above.
As a general matter within the Canadian federal system, it is constitu-
tionally permissible for a validly enacted provincial statute of general
application to affect matters coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Parliament. The principal question in any case involving exclusive federal
jurisdiction is whether the provincial statute trenches, either in its entirety
or in its application to specific factual contexts, upon a head of exclusive
federal power. Where a provincial statute trenches upon exclusive federal
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power in its application to specific factual contexts, the statute must be
read down so as not to apply to those situations. This principle of statu-
tory interpretation is known perhaps most commonly as the doctrine of
"interjurisdictional immunity...'
Although this four-step test was framed in the context of a negligence
claim, the Supreme Court said similar principles "very likely" apply in
other maritime law contexts.
The constitutional analysis in the present case is necessarily specifically
focussed upon the issue of maritime negligence law. Similar principles are
very likely applicable in relation to the applicability of provincial statutes
in other maritime law contexts, although we do not consider it appropriate
at this time, in the absence of factual backdrop plainly raising the issue,
to rule on the broader applicability of the test articulated here beyond the
maritime negligence law context. At the same time, we do not wish to be
understood as stating that no provincial law of general application will
ever be applicable in any maritime context, whether involving maritime
negligence law or not. Provincial statutes setting our rules of court, for
example, would generally be applicable where a maritime negligence ac-
tion is brought in the provincial superior court. Also, by way of example
only, we make no comments regarding the applicability of provincial
taxation statutes in maritime contexts. However, it will be relatively rare
that a provincial statute upon which a party seeks to rely in a maritime
negligence action will not have the effect of regulating a core issue of
maritime law.61
So the Supreme Court has not shut the door tightly on the possibility of
a provincial statute applying in a maritime context, but the crack appears
to be a narrow one. Certainly a provincial statute will not be applied if its
effect is to regulate a core issue of maritime law.
2. Priority Ranking of Claims under Maritime Law
It is important to bear in mind that many of the assets used in offshore
drilling and exploration activities are ships and as such are governed by
principles of maritime law. Offshore semi-submersible drilling rigs are
"ships. 6 2 A floating barge, even if incapable of self-propulsion, is a ship if
60. Supra note 19 at paras. 80-8 1.
61. Supra note 19 at para. 86.
62. See Seafarers'International Union of Canada-CLC-AFL-CIO v. Crosbie Offshore Services Ltd.,
[19821 2 F.C. 855, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 485.
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it is capable of being towed and moved from place to place.63 An oil drill-
ing barge capable of being moved from place to place was held to be a ship
in the United States in A-i Industries v. Barge Rig #2 .' Mobile drilling
platforms with retractable legs and submersible drilling barges which rest
on the sea bottom while drilling have been held to be ships in the United
States. 65
However, objects which are stationary and are, more or less, perma-
nently fixed in one location have been held not to be ships. A fixed produc-
tion platform constructed offshore and more or less fixed in one location
is not likely to be considered a ship. In Loffland Bros. v. Roberts,66 it was
held that a fixed offshore platform was not a ship. The important distinc-
tion is whether the object is more or less permanently fixed (in which case
it is probably not a ship) or whether it is capable of being moved and is
intended to do work on water (in which case it is a ship).
A determination that a particular asset used in the offshore is a ship is
significant in that disputes arising in respect of the asset will be subject to
maritime law (not provincial law) and the asset may be susceptible to liens
peculiar to maritime law, such as maritime liens. This in turn is significant
because maritime law has produced a well defined regime of ranking the
priorities of various types of claims against ships such as maritime liens,
liens for necessaries and marine mortgages.
In Scott Steel Ltd. v. The Alarissa,6v the Federal Court affirmed the
usual ranking of claims in maritime matters involving claims against ships
as follows:
(1) Disbursements associated with the seizure of the ship;
(2) Costs of the sale;
(3) Possessory liens in which the possession pre-dated other liens;
(4) Maritime liens;
(5) Possessory liens arising subsequent to a maritime lien;
(6) Marine Mortgages;
63. SeeTheMac(1882),7P.D. 126(C.A.);TheMudlark,[1911]P. 116 (Adm. Ct.); Cookv. Dredg-
ing & Construction Co., [1958] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 334; The Lighter No. 3 (1902), 18 T.L.R. 322 (Adm.
Ct.) and R. v. St. John Ship Building & Dry Dock Co. (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 353 (F.C.A.).
64. 2A.M.C. 1986 (E.D. La. 1979).
65. See Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 2 A.M.C. 2049 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Producers Drilling Co. v.
Gray, I A.M.C. 1260 (5th Cir. 1966).
66. 386 F 2d 540 (5th Cir. 1967).
67. [19961 2 F.C. 883 [Scott Steel].
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(7) Statutory rights in rem, including claims for the supply of
68necessaries.
An asset which is not a "ship" or "vessel", such as a permanent offshore
marine installation like a production platform, may not be subject to the
same types of liens that can be asserted against a ship; however, disputes
relating to such installations may be subject to maritime law on the basis
that the subject matter of the dispute (an offshore drilling platform for
instance) is "integrally connected" to maritime activities.
American authorities hold that maritime law does not apply to
permanent offshore installations like platforms. See Bertrand v. Shell,69
Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,7" Bourque v. Chevron,71 Sea
Robin Pipeline Co. v. Red Sea Group72 and, finally, Dickerson v. Continen-
tal Oil Co., 3 where it was said:
Since that court has decided that accidents which occur on such platforms
have "no more connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do
accidents on piers," we are compelled to agree that Louisiana Law ap-
plies. 74
As far as I have been able to determine, the extent to which maritime law
applies, if at all, to a permanent offshore installation has not been judicial-
ly considered in Canada. It therefore remains unclear whether or not the
usual ranking of priorities that applies in respect of claims against ships,
as set out in Scott Steel, would also apply in respect of claims against per-
manent offshore installations which are not ships.
68. Ibid. at paras. 7-8 where Hargrave P. states, "I have used the term 'usual ranking' as in my view
there are no immutable rules of ranking, but a usual ranking which is a manifestation of a consideration
over the years of then current equitable concerns, public policy considerations and commercial real-
ties." The "usual ranking" of priorities in a given case may be affected by express statutory provisions.
For example, statutory claims arising under Canadian federal statutes rank according to the provisions
of the relevant statutes. Under the Canada Shipping Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9. Part II) claims for
seamen's wages rank ahead of all other claims. See also Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Container
Line NV (Trustees of), [2000] FC.J. No. 197, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 188.
69. 489 F 2d 293 (5th Cir. 1973) (QL).
70. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
71. No. 03-0871, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9381 (E.D. La. 2003) (QL).
72. 919 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. La. 1996) (QL).
73. 449 F. 2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1971) (QL).
74. Ibid.
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3. Possessory Liens
Shipbuilders, repairers, and suppliers of goods and services necessary to
equip or improve a ship are entitled to a preferential lien under Cana-
dian maritime law, as long as possession of the vessel is maintained.75 In
Comeau 's Sea Foods Ltd v. The Frank and Troy,76 Keirstead D.J. describes
possessory liens under maritime law in the following terms:
At common law, a possessory lienholder has the right to retain possession
of goods belonging to another until certain demands of the lienholder
have been satisfied. The lienholder must remain continuously in posses-
sion of the goods if the lien is to continue. The lienholder has no power of
sale unless it has been given to him expressly by statute. Possessory liens
usually arise in connection with a ship repairer's claim for repairs, a ship
owner's claim for freight, or a cargo owner's claim for general average
contribution.
77
A possessory lien which has accrued at the time of the ship's arrest will
rank ahead of all mortgages (regardless of date), a subsequent maritime
lien, and any statutory rights in rem. However, the failure to maintain
possession of the ship is fatal to the validity of the possessory lien.
The consequences of relinquishing possession are well illustrated in
Benson Brothers Ship Building Co. (1960) v. The Miss Donna.78 In that
case, Benson Brothers repaired two ships. The ships were owned by the
defendant company and mortgaged to the Mercantile Bank of Canada.
After the repairs were finished, the ships were released to the owner with-
out payment having been made for the repairs. The ship repairer asserted
a claim for its outstanding accounts and had the two ships arrested. Sub-
sequently, the defendant was adjudged bankrupt and a receiver-manager
was appointed to take possession of the ships. Both ships were sold by the
receiver. The amount outstanding on the mortgages exceeded the amount
realized on the sale of the ships. It was held that the mortgage holder had
priority. The ship repairer lost its possessory lien when it gave up pos-
session of the vessels. It did not acquire a maritime lien against the ships
merely by reason of having arrested the ships. Addy J. stated that "a person
who has effected repairs on a ship, once he has relinquished possession of
it and has therefore abandoned any possessory lien to which he might have
75. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 26 (London: Butterworths, 1952 - 64) at paras. 984,
992, 997.
76. [1971] F.C. 556.
77. Ibid. at para. 10.
78. [1978] 1 F.C. 379.
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been entitled, is therefore in the same position as an ordinary creditor since
he has no maritime lien."79 The mere right to take an action in rem gives no
privilege, lien or preference of any kind.
A possessory lien will be lost even if possession is given up invol-
untarily - for instance where the vessel is seized by a mortgage holder.
In Greeley v. Tami Joan (The),8" the plaintiff entered into a charterparty
agreement with the owner of a fishing vessel in New Brunswick. The
vessel was taken by the plaintiff to Newfoundland where the plaintiff sup-
plied materials and equipment to the vessel to make her ready for fishing
operations. Subsequently, the plaintiff discovered the vessel was subject
to a mortgage held by the province of New Brunswick which had fallen
into arrears. In its capacity as mortgagee, the province of New Brunswick
seized the vessel while it was in port. The Federal Court considered the
following issues:
(1) whether New Brunswick was entitled to seize the vessel under its
mortgage;
(2) if so, whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to a possessory lien by
virtue of the equipment, supplies and improvements provided to the
vessel by the plaintiff; and
(3) the priority of New Brunswick's claim against the vessel by virtue of
its mortgage.
The Court held that the mortgage was properly registered by the province
of New Brunswick. As the mortgage was in arrears, New Brunswick was
legally entitled to seize the vessel. Gibson J. reviewed various authorities
supporting the proposition that a supplier of materials to a vessel is en-
titled to a possessory lien as long as possession of the vessel is maintained,
and that the possessory lien has priority over any mortgage on the ship.
Therefore where a mortgagee causes the supplier to lose possession, the
mortgagee must compensate the supplier by paying the amount of the lien.
In his decision, the trial judge, Gibson J., referred to Mortgages of Ships,
Marine Security in Canada8 where the author cites Hamilton v. Harland
& Wolff82 for the following proposition:
Where the supplier of materials to a vessel has possession of it, his prior-
ity over a mortgagee with respect to his claim will be recognized as a valid
possessory lien.
79. Ibid. at para. 18.
80. [1997] FC.J. No. 1131, aff'd [2001] F.C.J. No. 1162.
81. J.D. Buchan, Mortgages of Ships: Marine Security in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986).
82. (1880), 4 Asp. M.L.C. 254.
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Where a mortgagee is instrumental in a repairman with a possessory lien
losing possession, then he must compensate the repairman by paying the
amount of the lien which would rank in priority to his claim against the
vessel.
Justice Gibson also referred to Weir and Lewisporte Shipyard Ltd. v. Bank
of Nova Scotia, where Justice Goodridge of the Newfoundland Supreme
Court stated:
By selling the vessel and authorizing the purchasers to take possession the
mortgagee deprived the shipyard of its lien. A mortgagee seeking to take
possession of a vessel upon which he has a mortgage must first discharge
the possessory lien of the party who effected the repairs.
Because a repairman has a possessory lien which he loses when he loses
his possession, if a mortgagee is instrumental in the repairman with a pos-
sessory lien losing possession, then he must pay the amount of the lien to
the repairman. 83
Gibson J. then concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a possessory
lien for so long as possession of the vessel was maintained and, when
the plaintiff lost possession of the vessel due to its legal seizure by the
province of New Brunswick, any priority with respect to liens was lost.
Instead, the plaintiff was entitled to be paid the amount of his claim by the
mortgage holder who had seized the vessel:
In the result, I conclude that the Plaintiff was a "supplier of goods and
material" to the Tami Joan and that the Plaintiff was thus entitled to a pos-
sessory lien while he was in possession of the Tami Joan. But, according
to the foregoing quotations from Mortgages of Ships, Maritime Security
in Canada, when the Plaintiff lost possession of the Tami Joan by reason
of the seizure by New Brunswick which I have determined to be in ac-
cordance with law, the Plaintiff was left with nothing more than a right to
be paid the amount of his lien by New Brunswick.'
In light of the foregoing authorities, I conclude that, at the time this action
was commenced, the Plaintiff, then being out of possession of the Tami
Joan, had no basis on which to proceed in rem to enforce a possessory
83. (1979), 30 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 223.
84. Supra note 79 at paras. 41-44.
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lien. On the basis of his pre-existing possessory lien, he was, at that time,
in the words of Addy J., "...in the same position as an ordinary creditor
since he [had] no maritime lien. While the Plaintiff might have then had
a statutory right in rem for necessaries and repairs, any such right would
rank below the right of New Brunswick as a mortgagee in possession.85
In 2001, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the trial court decision.86 The
Appeal Court's reasoning was brief:
With respect to the third issue, the Trial Judge found that the appellant
was a supplier of goods and materials to the vessel, and accordingly this
provided the basis for a possessory lien. However, since the appellant lost
possession of the vessel due to its legal seizure by New Brunswick, and
therefore lost his priority with respect to any lien he might have, the ap-
pellant held no more than a right to be paid the amount of his lien, as any
other creditor.
87
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal made no mention of the lien claimant's
right to be paid by the mortgagee who had the seized vessel and, at the trial
level, the lien claimant's action was dismissed without any order requiring
the mortgagee to pay the amount of the supplier's lien claim. In any event,
it appears that the traditional priority afforded to possessory lien claims
under maritime law could fairly easily be defeated by a mortgagee under
a marine mortgage by the mortgagee seizing possession of the vessel
thereby causing the possessory lien to be lost. Presumably, however, and
despite the fact that there was no order to that effect made in the Tami Joan
case, a mortgagee who seizes a vessel remains liable to pay the amount of
any possessory lien lost due to the seizure of the vessel.
4. Maritime Liens
After pre-existing possessory liens, the usual ranking of priorities under
maritime law next recognizes maritime liens. A maritime lien is unique
among liens recognized at common law in that it may attach to a ship or its
cargo. The essential elements of a maritime lien are described in William
Tetley's book, Maritime Liens and Claims, in the following terms:
A traditional maritime lien is a secured right peculiar to maritime law (the
lex maritima). It is a privilege against property (a ship) which attaches
85. Supra note 79 at para. 44.
86. Greeley v. Tami Joan [2001 F.C.J. No. 1162 at para. 10 [Tami Joan].
87. Ibid. at para. 10.
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and gains priority without any court action or any deed or any registration.
It passes with the ship when the ship is sold to another owner, who may
not know of the existence of the lien. In this sense the maritime lien is a
secret lien which has no equivalent in the common law. RR
The maritime lien has been described by some authors as being akin to a
"leech on human skin," or perhaps more aptly as a "barnacle on the hull of
a ship," in that it travels undetected, but fully attached to its host.
In Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Container Line N.B. (Trusties of)),
Justice Binnie explained that:
The reason for this privileged status for maritime lien holders is entirely
practical. The ship may sail under a flag of convenience. Its owners may
be difficult to ascertain in a web of corporate relationships (as indeed was
the case here, where initially Holt named the wrong corporation as ship
owner). Merchant seamen will not work the vessel unless their wages
constitute a high priority against the ship. The same is true of others whose
work or supplies are essential to the continued voyage. The master may
be embarrassed for lack of funds, but the ship itself is assumed to be worth
something and is readily available to provide a measure of security. Reli-
ance on that security was and is vital to maritime commerce. Uncertainty
would undermine confidence. The appellant Trustees' claims to "inter-
national comity" in matters of bankruptcy must therefore be weighed
against competing considerations of a more ancient and at least equally
practical international system - the law of maritime commerce.89
Maritime law recognizes maritime liens for a distinct and somewhat lim-
ited class of claims. The principal claims that can give rise to a maritime
lien are claims for salvage, seamen's wages, and the shipmaster's wages,
disbursements, and liabilities. 9° Under Canadian maritime law, the provi-
sion of general supplies or "necessaries" does not afford the supplier a
maritime lien over the vessel. The case of Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Petromar
88. W. Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims, 2nd ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications,
1998) at 59-60. See also Harmer v. Bell - The Bold Buccleugh (1851), 13 E.R. 884 (P.C.).
89. (2002), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.) at para. 592 [Holt Cargo].
90. See Arthur J. Stone, "Canada's Admiralty Court in the Twentieth Century" (2002) 47 McGill L.
J. 511 at 539-540. As the authors noted in R.A. Morgolis and C.J. Giaschi, "Priorities and Bankruptcy
in Admiralty" (Paper presented at the Admiralty Law Programme of the Canadian Maritime Law As-
sociation and the Federal Court of Canada, April 2002) [unpublished] at 6: "Canadian Maritime Law
recognizes the same limited number of maritime liens as English Law, that is, the traditional liens for
salvage, collision, bottomry and respondentia, seamen's wages and masters disbursements as well as
the statutorily created maritime lien for masters wages."
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Inc.91 involved the supply of industrial lubricants to be used aboard a ves-
sel. Classifying this type of lubricant as a "necessary," the court noted
that "under the maritime law of the United States, unlike that of Canada,
a maritime lien for necessaries exists."92 The lien is created by statute in
the United States. Accordingly, the case turned on a conflict of laws issue,
specifically whether the laws of the United States, or the laws of Canada,
applied to the transaction. Finding that Canadian law applied, the court
held that the supplier did not have a lien.
Contractors and suppliers who provide labour and materials in con-
nection with the repair, maintenance or operation of a ship (such as a
semi-submersible drilling rig) will not be entitled to claim a maritime lien
under Canadian maritime law if the labour or materials are supplied in
Canada. The situation may be different, however, if goods and services are
provided in another country. If the law of another jurisdiction applies to a
particular dispute, the courts in Canada will give effect to those laws. This
was decided in Holt Cargo, where the Supreme Court of Canada stated
that:
A maritime lien validly created under foreign law will be recognized and
will be given the same priority in Canada as would be given to a maritime
lien created in Canada under Canadian maritime law "unless opposed to
some rule of domestic policy or procedure which prevents the recognition
of the right."93
A maritime lien ranks behind pre-existing possessory liens but ahead of
other claims including marine mortgages. In Todd Shipyard Corp. v. loan-
nis Daskalelis (The), the Supreme Court of Canada stated:
Under Canadian law, the claim of a mortgagee whether registered or
unregistered and whether in possession or not ranks below the claims of
persons having a maritime lien on the mortgaged ship.94
5. Necessaries
"Necessaries" are products, goods or services necessary for the operation
or maintenance of a ship such as fuel and lubricants. Under Canadian
maritime law, a claim in respect of the supply of necessaries does not
91. [2002]3F.C. 190, 2001 FCA391.
92. Ibid. at para. 24.
93. Holt Cargo, supra note 89 at para. 41.
94. [1974] S.C.R. 1248 at headnote para. 2.
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give rise to a maritime lien nor any other type of lien other than a possible
possessory lien where the supplier maintains possession of the vessel.95
Under subsection 22(2)(m) of the Federal Court Act,96 the Federal Court
of Canada is conferred jurisdiction to deal with "any claims in respect of
goods, materials or services wherever supplied to a ship for the operation
or maintenance of the ship." Under section 43(2) of the Federal Court
Act, the Court generally has the authority to exercise its jurisdiction in
rem (against the ship); however, subsection 43(3) provides that the juris-
diction of the Court in respect of claims under subsection 22(2)(m) (i.e.,
the supply of goods and services to a ship), among other claims, shall not
be exercised in rem unless, at the time the action is commenced, the ship
is owned by the same person who was the beneficial owner at the time
when the cause of action arose. This qualification on the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court in rem has been interpreted to mean that a claim for goods
and services under section 22(2)(m) of the Federal Court Act cannot give
rise to a lien against the ship because the claim, as against the ship, would
be defeated by a change in ownership. This was explained by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Petromar Inc.:
97
The Trial Judge noted and the parties agreed that Canadian maritime
law does not recognize a maritime lien for necessaries. This is apparent
from an examination of the relevant provisions of the Federal Court Act,
R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7. While subsection 22 (2) of the Act lists various mat-
ters over which the Federal Court is granted jurisdiction, the Court's juris-
diction in rem over claims included in Section 22 is, by subsection 43(3),
so limited that a claim "in respect of goods, materials or services... sup-
plied to a ship for the operation or maintenance of the ship" provided for
in paragraph 22 (2)(m), cannot be enforced in an action in rem "unless, at
the time of the commencement of the action, the ship...that is the subject
of the action is beneficially owned by the person who was the beneficial
owner at the time when the cause of action arose". The result in law is
that an unpaid supplier of goods to a vessel cannot claim the benefit of
a maritime lien against the vessel. Instead, such a person is left to bring
an action in rem against the vessel provided its beneficial ownership has
not changed between the date the cause of action arose and the date the
action is commenced, or to pursue the debtor in an action in personam in
this Court or elsewhere. The case law both in England and in Canada is
clearly to the effect that a supplier of necessaries is not entitled to a mari-
95. See Tami Joan, supra note 86.
96. R.S.C. 1985, c. f-7, s. 22(2)(m) [Federal Court Act].
97. Supra note 91.
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time lien but only to a statutory right in rem which is sometimes referred
to as a "statutory lien". 98
In summary, maritime liens for necessaries are not recognized under Cana-
dian law. They are recognized under American maritime law and Canadian
courts will give effect to such liens if, in a particular case, it is determined
on the application of conflicts of law principles that American law applies.
Otherwise, absent a possessory lien, a claim for necessaries does not give
rise to a lien, but rather a statutory right to bring an action in rem before the
Federal Court.9 9 A similar type of analysis would be involved in respect of
"any claim arising out of a contract relating to the construction, repair or
equipping of a ship" under subsection 22(2)(n) of the Federal Court Act
which is, under section 43(3), subject to a qualification in respect of the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court similar to claims for goods and services
under section 22(2)(m).
6. Statutory Rights in rem
Under section 22 of the Federal Court Act, the Federal Court of Canada is
conferred jurisdiction over a "shopping list" of claims relating to maritime
law matters including, for instance, claims with respect to title, posses-
sion or ownership of a ship, claims under ship mortgages, claims relating
to agreements respecting carriage of goods by ship, claims in respect of
goods, materials or services supplied for the operation or maintenance of
a ship and claims arising out of a contract for the construction or repair
of a ship. Some of these matters have been recognized at common law as
giving rise to a lien against the ship and others have not.
Under section 43 of the Federal Court Act, the jurisdiction conferred
on the Federal Court under section 22 can, with certain exceptions, be
exercised in rem - which is to say against the ship which is the subject
matter of a proceeding before the Federal Court. The authority of the Fed-
eral Court to exercise its jurisdiction in rem (including the power to order
the ship to be sold in order to pay a claim in respect of which the Court
has jurisdiction under section 22) is said to give rise to a "statutory lien"
against the ship.
In maritime law, the term "statutory lien" has a specialized meaning.
It does not refer to a "statutory lien" of the type arising under a provincial
or federal statute of general application, such as a lien under the Labour
98. Supra note 91 at para. 25.
99. Supra note 91 See also Kirgan Holding S.C. v. Panamax Leader [2002] F.C.J. No. 1694.
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Standards Code"° or a lien under the Workers Compensation Act.'0'
Rather, it means "statutory liens in rem" that can be asserted against a ship
under maritime law. However, the term "statutory lien," in the context of
maritime law, is something of a misnomer since the term is used to refer to
claims which do not give rise to a "lien" at all. The words "statutory rights
in rem" are perhaps more accurate. This was explained by Hargrave P. of
the Federal Court of Canada in Scott Steel Ltd. v. Alarissa'02 :
...one ought not to use the term "statutory lien" for those claiming a mere
right in rem, but rather the proper term is "statutory right in rem" when
one refers to the claims of necessary suppliers and other claimants who
do not strictly speaking have a lien, but rather have the use of a right in
rem under subsection 43(2) of the Federal Court Act in order to enforce
a debt.'l 3
The most common types of claims that give rise to "statutory rights in
rem" are claims arising out of contracts for carriage of goods, claims for
the supply of goods, materials or services necessary for the operation or
maintenance of a ship, and claims arising out of contracts for the construc-
tion, repair or equipping of a ship. Claims of this nature are defeated by
a transfer of ownership of the ship. No maritime lien is created on the
vessel to which the goods or services are supplied. Claims giving rise to
statutory rights in rem rank in priority behind possessory liens and marine
mortgages. 104
III. Statutory Liens
Having reviewed the legal framework applicable in the offshore under
international, constitutional and maritime law, we turn now to consider
the subject matter of the paper. To what extent can statutory liens created
under federal and provincial legislation of general application be asserted
against assets used in the exploration and development of oil and gas
resources in the areas offshore Newfoundland and Nova Scotia? The re-
mainder of this paper will consider construction liens, liens derived from
labour standards codes and workers compensation statutes and, finally,
liens derived from federal taxes and crown royalties.
100. S.C. 1964-65, c. 38.
101. R.S.O. 1980, c. 539.
102. Supra note 67.
103. Supra note 67 at para. 9.
104. Supra note 82.
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1. Construction (Mechanics') Liens
Is a contractor, who provides labour or materials in connection with the
construction or repair of a ship or other vessel, entitled to claim a lien
under provincial builders' or construction lien legislation? At first blush, it
might seem an odd question. Builders' and construction liens are ordinar-
ily considered in the context of work on a building or other structure on
land and there is no connection to any terrafirma where the work involved
is on a ship or vessel. A ship is obviously not real property, it is personal
property - a chattel.
In Nova Scotia, however, where the construction lien statute continues
to be known by a somewhat antiquated name, the Mechanics' Lien Act"°5
purports to confer lien rights on anyone who performs work or supplies
material to construct, improve or repair any "ship" or "vessel." The rele-
vant provisions are contained in section 6 which reads in part as follows:
6(1) Unless he signs an express agreement to the contrary and in that
case subject to section 4, any person who performs any work or service
upon or in respect of, or places or furnishes any material to be used in the
making, constructing, erecting, fitting, altering, improving, or repairing of
any erection, building, railway, ship, vessel, land, wharf, pier, bulkhead,
bridge, trestlework, vault, mine, well, excavation.. or the appurtenances
to any of them, for any owner, contractor or subcontractor, shall by virtue
thereof have a lien for the price of such work, service or materials upon
the erection, building, railway, ship, vessel, .... and the land occupied
thereby...
The first question that comes to mind is how does someone claim and real-
ize upon a lien, under the Mechanics' Lien Act, against a ship or vessel?
The Mechanics' Lien Act sets out a process whereby lien claimants must
register a claim of lien against the land in respect of which the work was
performed at the appropriate registry of deeds office within a stipulated
period of time. The lien rights are lost if the contractor fails to do so. If the
claim of lien is properly registered at the land registry within the required
time limit and the lien claimant is successful at trial in establishing its right
to a lien, then the Act gives the Court the power to order the land against
which the lien is asserted to be sold, and the funds used to pay the out-
standing claim. Obviously that procedure has no relevance where a lien is
asserted against a ship or vessel. Where a lien is claimed against a chattel,
105. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 277 [Mechanics'Lien Act].
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the Mechanics' Lien Act in Nova Scotia gives the lien claimant the right
to sell the chattel at auction. This right is outlined in section 45 of the Act
which provides as follows:
45(1) Every mechanic or other person who has bestowed money or skill
and materials upon any chattel or thing in the alteration or improvements
in its properties, or for the purpose of imparting an additional value to
it, so as thereby to be entitled to a lien upon such chattel or thing for the
amount or value of the money or skills and materials bestowed, shall,
while such lien exists, but not afterwards, in the case the amount to which
he is entitled remains unpaid for three months after the same ought to
have been paid, have the right, in addition to all other remedies provided
by law, to sell by auction the chattel or thing in respect to which the lien
exists on getting one week's notice by advertisement in a newspaper pub-
lished in the county in which the work was done,...
Note that the right of sale under section 45 continues only "while such
lien exists." The Act offers no guidance as to when a lien against a ship or
vessel arises initially. Nor does the Act tell us for how long or under what
circumstances the lien will continue "to exist" so as to preserve the right
of sale under section 45.
It seems likely that the words "while such lien exists" in section 45
were intended to be a reference to the period of time during which a lien
exists at common law. The common law recognizes a lien against a chattel
in favour of anyone who provides labour or material to repair or improve
a chattel. But the common law lien is a possessory lien. It exists only for
so long as the claimant maintains possession of the chattel. When posses-
sion is relinquished, the lien is lost. 106 The intent of section 45, likely, was
to say that when the lien is lost (i.e. when possession is relinquished), the
right of sale under section 45 terminates.
The case law does not provide any guidance as to the nature of the lien
created under section 6 against ships or vessels. The case law also does
not tell us whether such lien exists independent of the common law. It is
not clear either, where a lien does exist independently of the common law,
how the lien can be enforced - much less what type of priority it would
have in relation to other claims against the ship, like marine mortgages.
All of this may, however, be considered academic for two reasons.
The first is that any claim against a ship or vessel clearly falls within the
106. See Hutchison v. Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd., [1972] N.S.J. No. 208; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 570
(N.S.S.C.).
Statutory Liens in the Atlantic Canada Offshore Area
ambit of maritime law. The pronouncements by the Supreme Court over
the course of the past ten or fifteen years in cases like ITO, °7 Whitbread, °8
Monk °9 and Ordon Estate10 make it reasonably clear that the maritime
law of Canada is to be regarded as a comprehensive body of federal law
that is uniform across the country within which provincial law is not gen-
erally applicable. It is difficult to imagine the Court giving effect to a
lien against a ship arising under a provincial statute (like the Nova Scotia
Mechanics'Lien Act) in a way that would vary the rights of creditors and
the priorities of their claims as established by long-standing principles of
maritime law.
Secondly, the Nova Scotia Mechanics'Lien Act"' may soon be amend-
ed to remove the references to liens against ships and vessels in section
6. In January of 2003, the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia re-
leased a discussion paper"l2 on proposed amendments to the Nova Scotia
Mechanics' Lien Act. The Commission's report notes that "with the ex-
ception of Nova Scotia, all of the Atlantic Canadian provinces have made
amendments to their builder's liens statutes as recently as the 1990s." The
Commission stated:
The Commission does not consider it appropriate that a statute meant to
provide protection for those involved with construction projects on land
should also refer to liens on a ship or vessel. To illustrate the strange
results that can ensue, a lien holder would not be able to register a lien
claim against a ship at a registry of deeds, which functions only to record
information relating to land ownership. The Commission agrees that the
reference to ships and vessels should be deleted from s. 6.113
There is no indication in the report that a mechanic's lien against a ship
(like any other chattel) could, theoretically at least, be enforced through
the power of sale provisions contained in section 45 of the Mechanics'
Lien Act. Rather, the Commission recognized the more fundamental prob-
lem with the concept of a provincial statute purporting to create a lien
against a ship. The problem is that the Supreme Court decisions in the last
decade make it reasonably clear that there is little or no room for the ap-
107. Supra note 47.
108. Supra note 51.
109. Supra note 54.
110. Supra note 19.
111. Supra note 105.
112. Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Builders'Liens in Nova Scotia: reform of the Mechan-
ics'Lien Act (Nova Scotia: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, 2003).
113. Ibid. at 30.
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plication of provincial law in matters governed by maritime law. As the
Commission states:
Given recent developments in Canadian maritime law, the Nova Scotia
[Mechanics' Lien] Act may not be applicable in any event to provide for
a lien on a ship. In a series of decisions in the 1980s and the 1990s, the
Supreme Court of Canada set out the character of Canadian maritime law,
the body of law which governs aspects of navigation and shipping and
related matters in this country. [footnote omitted] This law is under fed-
eral jurisdiction. It is uniform across Canada, regardless of which court
is applying it. It is based in part on the principles of the English common
law, relating to such aspects as contract and tort, that had been incorpo-
rated into Canadian law. It is also not the law of any province. What this
means is that where there is federal law to govern a matter that falls under
the scope of Canadian maritime law, there is no longer any room for the
operation of a provincial statute. Federal law relating to ship repairs or
related work does exist, in the form of s. 22(2)(n) of the Federal Court
Act [footnote omitted] when read in conjunction with s. 43(3) of the same
statute.''
4
The Commission's recommendation that the reference to "ships" and
"vessels" be deleted from the definition of activities giving rise to a lien
under s. 6 of the Mechanics'Lien Act has not been implemented to date.
The difficulty in applying provincial lien statutes in the context of
claims against ships is illustrated in Finning Ltd. v. The Federal Busi-
ness Development Bank.115 In that case, a vessel subject to the defendant's
mortgage, which was registered under the Canada Shipping Act, was re-
paired by the plaintiff and returned to the owner. The plaintiff was not paid
and registered a lien against the vessel under the Repairer's Lien Act"
6 of
British Columbia. The ship owner was subsequently placed in receiver-
ship and the defendant sold the vessel under its mortgage. The Court was
asked to determine whether the plaintiff's lien ranked in priority to the
defendant's mortgage. The case raised the constitutional validity of the
Repairer's Lien Act of British Columbia. The Attorney General of the
114. Ibid. at31.
115. (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 379 (B.C.S.C.).
116. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 363 [Repairer's Lien Act].
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province intervened and took part in the hearing. The Court specifically
examined the following issues:
(a) Does the Repairer's Lien Act apply to vessels registered under the
Canada Shipping Act.
(b) If the answer to question (a) is yes, is the Province of British Co-
lumbia constitutionally capable of changing the system of priorities in
admiralty law such that the claim of a possessory lien claimant who has
given up possession will rank ahead of a claim by a mortgagee under a
registered ship's mortgage.
(c) If the answers to (a) and (b) are yes, does the claim of the repairer's
lien filed by the Plaintiff rank in priority to the mortgage granted by [the
ship owner] to Federal Business Development Bank.117
In reference to the first issue, the Court examined the definition of "boat"
contained in the British Columbia Repairer's Lien Act and the definitions
of "ship" and "vessel" contained in the Canada Shipping Act. The Court
held that the definition of "boat" in the Repairer's Lien Act extended to
vessels registered under the Canada Shipping Act.
The second issue raised the question whether the provincial Repairer's
Lien Act conflicted with a statute of the Federal Parliament. Cowan J.
quoted from Professor Hogg, who states the following in his text, Consti-
tutional Law of Canada:
The rule which has been adopted by the courts is the doctrine of "federal
paramountcy": where there are inconsistent (or conflicting) federal and
provincial laws, it is the federal law which prevails. 11
The Court then referred to the following passage of McIntyre J. as stated
in the ITO case as follows:
It is my view as set out above, that Canadian maritime law is a body of
federal law encompassing the common law principles of tort, contract and
bailment. I am also of the opinion that Canadian maritime law is uniform
throughout Canada, a view also expressed by Le Dain, J. in the Court of
Appeal who applied the common law principles of bailment to resolve
117. Supra note 115 at 381.
118. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 1985) at 354.
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Miida's claim against ITO. Canadian maritime law is that body of law
defined in s. 2 of the Federal Court Act. That law was the maritime law of
England as it has been incorporated into Canadian law and it is not the law
of any Province of Canada."9
The Court also referred to Comeau's Seafood Ltd. v. The Frank and Troy
and stated that "possessory liens were recognized as part of the mar-
itime law of England and have been recognized as part of Canadian
maritime law."12
The British Columbia Repairer's Lien Act, at that time, provided that
a possessory lien would be preserved even though possession was relin-
quished as long as there was compliance with the registration provisions
of the Act. This conflicted with Canadian maritime law which requires
continuous possession in order to establish a valid possessory lien. The
Court concluded that the Repairer's Lien Act could not apply in the context
of a claim against a ship governed by maritime law:
The doctrine of paramountcy applies. To the extent that the Repairer's
Lien Act purports to create a.. .form of possessory lien which is not rec-
ognized by Canadian maritime law and thereby affects priorities under
Canadian maritime law, the answer to [question (b)] must be no. Accord-
ingly, the claim of repairers' lien filed by Finning Ltd. not being a valid
possessory lien under Canadian maritime law, it must rank after the de-
fendant bank's mortgage.2 '
It is noteworthy that the Newfoundland Mechanics' Lien Act 22 is limited
to liens on real estate within the boundaries of the provinces. The off-
shore areas beyond the limits of Canada's territorial seas (i.e., beyond the
twelve-mile limit) are not, as indicated earlier, within the boundaries of
Canada or any province and, consequently, could not be subjected to any
kind of real property lien.
2. Labour Standards Codes and Workers Compensation Statutes
Many provinces in Canada have legislation under which an employee's
claim for unpaid wages can give rise to a lien against the assets of the
employer. Section 79(1)(b) of the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Code123
119. Supra note 47 at paras. 31-32.
120. Supra note 76.
121. Finning Ltd. v. The Federal Business Development Bank, supra note 112 at 384.
122. R.S.N.L. 1990, c. M-3.
123. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 246.
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requires an employer to make payments of wages to its employees within
five working days after the expiration of each pay period. Failure to do
so may result in the Labour Standards Tribunal issuing an order requiring
the payment to be made to the Tribunal. It also provides for the creation
of a lien and a deemed mortgage against the assets of the employer for the
amount of such an order. Further, under section 88 of the Labour Stan-
dards Act, the lien and deemed mortgage is stated to "be payable in prior-
ity over all liens, charges or mortgages of every person in respect of the
real and personal property of the employer, including those of Her Majesty
in right of the Province, but excepting liens for wages due to workmen by
that employer."
The Newfoundland Labour Standards Act'24 requires an employer to
pay an employee all wages earned by the employee within seven days
after the end of the pay period. The Act does not specifically create a lien
or charge on the assets of the employer; however, section 37 provides that
an employee's wage claim has priority over all other claims against the
employer.
Various provinces in Canada (including Nova Scotia and Newfound-
land) have also enacted workers' compensation statutes pursuant to which
assessments are levied on employers engaged in certain industries. As-
sessments are typically calculated as a percentage of the payroll paid by
the employer and are intended to provide a fund to compensate workers
injured in work-related activities. The Nova Scotia Workers Compensa-
tion Act 25 applies to employers engaged in boat building, construction,
drilling, engine and machinery installation and repair, engineering, geo-
physical explorations, shipbuilding, steel and iron works and structural
steel, iron and metal fabrication, among other industries listed in Appendix
A of the Act. 126 The Act imposes a lien when an employer fails to remit
a required assessment. The lien is imposed against all real and personal
property used in connection with the industry for which the employer has
been assessed, regardless of whether or not it is owned by the employer.
Section 147 states that the lien "is payable in priority to any other claim
or encumbrance of any kind held by any person." The corresponding
statute in Newfoundland is the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensa-
tion Act.127 Section 118.2 establishes that any amount certified as being in
default for the payment of an assessment is, until paid, "a first lien upon
124. R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-2.
125. S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10.
126. Workers' Compensation General Regulations, N.S. Reg. 146/2002.
127. R.S.N.L. 1990, c. W-1.
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the entire assets of the person and has priority over all other claims except
a claim for unpaid wages under the Labour Standards Code 28 and a me-
chanics' lien registered under the Mechanics'Lien Act."
The provincial statutes under consideration (labour standards and
workers compensation statutes) have not to date been extended to the
offshore area on the continental shelf either through regulations under the
Oceans Act or through other legislation. Nevertheless, it is worth con-
sidering the provincial statutory liens for a number of reasons. The first
is that the provincial statutes could be relevant in the context of a dispute
regarding an asset which is used, or is to be used, in offshore oil and gas
activities but which, at the relevant time, is located in a harbour, bay, in-
let or other inland waterway that is within the boundaries of a province.
Second, it is worth considering how a provincial statutory lien might "fit"
into the priority rankings under maritime law in respect of assets located
offshore in the event that federal legislation is adopted to extend the ap-
plication of the provincial statutes to the offshore areas.
One of the few cases that has considered the validity and priority of a
lien created under a provincial statute as against a ship or vessel is Fed-
eral Business Development Bank v. The Ship "Winder 4135.' 129 The case
involved a motion for an order determining priorities of proceeds from
the sale of a ship ("The Winder"), between the Federal Business Develop-
ment Bank (the "FBDB") and the Workers' Compensation Board of British
Columbia. The FBDB held a mortgage registered on February 11, 1981 at
the Registry of Shipping in Vancouver. The mortgage was granted by the
defendant ship owner, Eiger Booiming Ltd. The Workers Compensation
Board of British Columbia filed certificates on November 17, 1980 and
September 11, 1981 for amounts owed by the defendant for assessments
levied under section 45 of the British Columbia Workers Compensation
Act. 130 The vessel was seized on August 31, 1981 and subsequently sold.
The issue of priorities, as between the FBDB as mortgage holder and the
Workers Compensation Board, was submitted to the Federal Court for
determination.
Section 52 of the British Columbia Workers Compensation Act pro-
vides that a lien pursuant to the Act is "payable in priority over all liens,
charges or mortgages of every person, whenever created or to be created"
with respect to property or proceeds from the sale of property used in con-
nection with the industry in which the employer was assessed.
128. Supra note 123.
129. [1986] 2 EC. 154, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 308 [Winder].
130. R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 492 [British Columbia Workers Compensation Act].
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Justice Walsh of the Federal Court began his analysis by pointing out
that the issue, as to the priority of a statutory lien under a provincial statute
in the context of a maritime matter, had not previously come before the
courts in Canada.
The issue is one which does not appear to have been determined by any
judgment rendered in a maritime law case in this country or, for that mat-
ter, in England, according to counsel for the parties. There is no question
as to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court over any claim as to title, pos-
session or ownership of the vessel or any part interest therein, or with
respect to the proceeds of the sale of the ship or any part interest therein,
pursuant to paragraph 22(2)(a) of the Federal Court Act.
... There is no federal statute setting out the priorities but the order of pri-
orities is generally recognized as part of Canadian maritime law. There
does not appear to be any case, however, where the question has been
decided as to the priority to be given to a claim resulting from a valid
provincial statute and its rank with respect to claims recognized under
maritime law, so the issue can only be settled by analogy to various cases
dealing with the ranking of maritime law claims. 3 '
The Court went on to point out that under established principles of mar-
itime law possessory liens, maritime liens and registered mortgages all
have priority over "statutory liens," as that term is used in the context of
maritime law. As we have seen, the term "statutory lien," as used in a
maritime law context, has a specialized meaning and is not generally, if at
all, used in maritime law to refer to liens created under provincial statutes
of general application, such as labour standards codes or workers' com-
pensation legislation. Justice Walsh did not decide, one way or the other,
whether the Workers Compensation Board had a "statutory lien" under
maritime law. He did say, however, that even if the Board had a valid
lien under maritime law, it would be subordinate to the mortgage held by
FBDB on the basis of recognized maritime law principles:
Even if the lien which the Workers' Compensation Board of British Co-
lumbia claims, therefore, resulting from the Workers Compensation Act of
British Columbia, is recognized as a valid lien against the vessel, it would
be postponed according to this judgment to registered mortgages in exis-
tence at the time the ship was arrested to enforce this lien.'
32
131. Supra note 129 at paras. 8, 10.
132. Supra note 129 at para. 11.
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The Federal Court held that the lien created under section 52 of the British
Columbia Workers Compensation Act did not give the Board a right to an
action in rem against the vessel.'33
The Court then reviewed a number of American authorities which
held, in effect, that a lien created under a state or federal statute of general
application (such as a tax statute) constitutes a "non-maritime" type of
claim which ranks behind liens and claims in rem (against the ship) recog-
nized under maritime law:
In all of these cases the term "maritime lien" seems to be used in a broader
sense than that in which it is used under our maritime law and includes
registered mortgages. Counsel for the Workers' Compensation Board
points out, however, that the decision in these cases were based on the fact
that United States federal authority could have legislated so as to give its
tax claims priority over ship's mortgages had it so desired, but had failed
to do so. In the present case, it is argued, that federal authority could have
passed a statute enacting priority of maritime law claims against the pro-
ceeds of the sale of a ship in the same manner as it had enacted priorities
in section 107 of the Bankruptcy Act, over which is also has jurisdiction,
but it failed to do so.
I find it difficult to conclude, however, that its failure to do so created an
unoccupied field, as it were, and that therefore provincial law could be
applied in a dispute depending on whether the provincial law concerning
property and civil rights (which co-exists with and overlaps the federal
admiralty law, as the judgment of Chief Justice Jackett in the Evie W case
(supra) suggests) would have the result of ranking the claim of the Board
to a lien for the amounts due, at least prior to the registration of plaintiff's
mortgage, if not for the entire amounts due, ahead of the claim of plaintiff
in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel.'34
The Court then addressed a number of previous Canadian cases which had
held that a lien of the type created under section 52 of the British Colum-
bia Workers Compensation Act had priority even in respect of previously
registered mortgages.135 The Court distinguished these cases on the basis
that none of them involved a ship.
In the present case it would appear that it is not the ship which is liable
for the workers' compensation claim, but rather the owners of it, the ship
133. Supra note 129 at para. 12.
134. Supra note 129 at paras. 20-21.
135. See for example Winder case.
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being only one part of their property subject to a lien, along with other
property of the owners.136
The Court said that the Board had the right "to seize the vessel as part of
the property of the defendant..." but that "it had no specific rights against
the vessel until this seizure was made."' 37 This part of the decision is
somewhat confusing since it appeared from the judgment that the vessel
had in fact been seized in this case pursuant to the certificates issued for
the outstanding workers compensation assessments owing by the ship
owner. Regardless, the Federal Court concluded that the registered ship
mortgage had priority. The reasoning supporting that conclusion is not
easy to discern precisely from the decision.
I agree with the statement in the American case of Flood (supra) that "the
theoretical basis for the primacy of maritime claims is that they 'attach to
the vessel itself as an instrument of commerce' while other claims are de-
rived only through the owner." I believe this is the policy which should be
adopted and that, therefore, the claim of plaintiff by virtue of its registered
mortgage must prevail over that of the Workers' Compensation Board of
British Columbia arising from its claim against the ship's owner for
workers' compensation assessments. The proceeds of the sale of the ship
should be distributed accordingly, with costs in favour of plaintiff.'38
The Court's rationale seems to be that the bank's marine mortgage was
entitled to priority because it was in the nature of a maritime claim which
attached to the vessel itself while other "non-maritime" claims derive only
through the owner. This reasoning is not entirely satisfactory when one
considers that the competing claim in this case arose under the Workers
Compensation Act which purported to create a lien which attached to all
assets of the assessed employer including the ship which was the subject
of the dispute.
Nevertheless, the result in Winder appears to be correct. It is entirely
consistent with the general views of the Supreme Court in cases that fol-
lowed it in the 1990s such as ITO, 13 9 Whitbread,40 Monk 14' and Ordon
Estate.'4 2 In those cases the Supreme Court emphasized that Canadian
136. Supra note 129 at para. 23.
137. Supra note 129 at para. 29.
138. Supra note 129 at para. 30.
139. Supra note 47.
140. Supra note 51.
141. Supra note 54.
142. Supra note 19.
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maritime law was a body of federal law that was to be uniform across
the country such that there is very little room for the incidental applica-
tion of provincial law in a matter governed by maritime law principles.
Canadian law recognizes a fairly well-established set of rules relating
to the priority of claims in maritime matters. Clearly, the injection of a
provincial statutory lien into the established scheme of priorities under
maritime law would constitute a "regulation of a core issue of maritime
law" - something the Supreme Court has said the provincial legislatures
do not have the authority to do. 143 Overall, provincial statutory liens have
little relevance, if any, in the context of offshore assets used for oil and gas
exploration and production.
3. Federal Taxes and Crown Royalties
Various federal statutes create liens for obligations owed to Her Majesty
in right of Canada for taxes and crown royalties. There are, to date, no
statutory lien provisions in respect of crown royalties payable in respect of
oil and gas production offshore Nova Scotia. There are in Newfoundland,
however.
The statutory lien provisions for crown royalties in the Newfoundland
offshore arise pursuant to the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord
Implementation Act (Newfoundland) and the Canada-Newfoundland At-
lantic Accord Implementation Act (Canada).'" Both Acts were passed in
1987. Section 97 of the Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada)'n states the
following:
97(2) There is hereby reserved to Her Majesty in the right of Canada and
each holder of a share in a production license is liable for and shall
pay to Her Majesty in right of Canada, in accordance with subsec-
tion (4), the royalties, interest and penalties that would be payable in
respect of petroleum under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act [of
Newfoundland] if the petroleum were produced from areas within
the Province [of Newfoundland].
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where petroleum is subject to a roy-
alty under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, that petroleum is not
subject to a royalty under subsection (2).
143. See Ordon Estate, supra note 19.
144. R.S.N. 1990, c. C-2 [NewfoundlandAccordAct (Newfoundland)]; S.C. 1987, c. 3[Newfoundland
Accord Act (Canada)].
145. Ibid.
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(4) Subject to this Act and the regulations, the Petroleum and Natural
Gas Act [of Newfoundland] and any regulations made thereunder
apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, for the
purposes of this section and, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing,
(a) a reference in that Act to Her Majesty in right of the Province
shall be deemed to be a reference to Her Majesty in right of
Canada; and
(b) a reference in that Act to the Province of Newfoundland or the
Province shall be deemed to be a reference to the offshore area.
Provisions in the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act 46 create a lien in favour
of the Province of Newfoundland in respect of royalties owing from the
production of oil and gas onshore Newfoundland.
The lien for royalties is created under Part II of the Petroleum and
Natural Gas Act.'47 Section 35 states:
35. (1) Notwithstanding a provision of this or another Act or regulation,
royalty share due to the Crown under this Part, until paid, shall
constitute a first and paramount lien in favour of the Crown on all
assets of the person owing the royalty share, and on assets held
by a secured creditor of that person that, but for a security inter-
est, would be assets of the person owing the royalty share.
(2) A lien created under this section shall attach on the date the roy-
alty share is due and payable to the Crown and continues in forth
until paid or released by the Crown.
Statutory liens are also created in favour of Her Majesty in right of Can-
ada in respect of obligations owing for unremitted source deductions of
income tax and employment insurance premiums under the Income Tax
Act 4 ' and for unremitted goods and services tax under the Excise Tax
Act. 149 The statutory liens under the Income Tax Act and Excise Tax Act do
not purport to be "first and paramount" liens as is the case for outstanding
crown royalties.
It remains to be seen whether the statutory liens created under federal
146. R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-10.
147. Ibid.
148. S.N.L. 2000, c. I-I1 [Income Tax Act].
149. S.C. 1991, c. 12 [Excise TaxAct].
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statutes for tax and royalty obligations will apply to assets used in offshore
oil and gas exploration and production activities and, if so, what priority
such liens will have in relation to other claims against those assets having
regard to the fact that many of the assets would be subject to maritime law.
There is little guidance in Canadian jurisprudence. A number of cases in
Canada have considered provincial statutory liens but no cases have been
identified considering federal statutory liens under the Income Tax Act or
Excise Tax Act or for crown royalties in relation to assets which are subject
to maritime law.
Similar issues have, however, been canvassed in a number of Ameri-
can cases. In United States v. Flood,"' the issue on the appeal was whether
a lien of the United States for unpaid federal taxes asserted in relation to a
vessel owned by the taxpayer took precedence over various maritime liens
for supplies furnished to the vessel. The United States claimed a lien for
unpaid taxes. Flood asserted claims under two ship mortgages as well as
maritime liens for supplies furnished to the vessel. The government's lien
for taxes was based upon provisions of section 3670 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939 which created a lien in favour of the United States for
outstanding taxes "upon all property and rights to property" belonging to
the taxpayer. The United States Court of Appeal held that the government
tax lien was a "non-maritime lien" as it did not arise out of a maritime
transaction and was subordinate to the maritime lien and ship mortgages.
The Court stated:
Though there is no doubt of the paramount power of the Congress to alter
in favour of the United States the settled priorities of liens under the gen-
eral maritime law, the question is whether we can read such a legislative
purpose into the simple language of §3670, which contains no express
provision giving priority to the government's tax lien and which, indeed,
does not profess to modify the familiar rules of the general maritime law.
Throughout the long history of the general maritime law, maritime liens
have uniformly been given preference over secured non-maritime claims
of other kinds, both prior and subsequent .... The theoretical basis for the
primacy of maritime claims is that they "attach to the vessel itself as an
instrument of commerce", while other claims are derived only through
the owner....
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If the far-reaching step of upsetting the well established system of priority
of maritime liens should be taken, it seems to us that the Congress is much
better equipped to work out a comprehensive solution of the problems in-
volved, for example, to determine which types of maritime claims will be
relegated to a position junior to a tax claim of the government and which
types of maritime claims will remain senior to it. 5 '
There are a number of other American authorities supporting the view that
a lien for taxes under a state or federal statute of general application is a
"non-maritime" lien and, absent clear and express provisions in the statute
to the contrary, such a lien is subordinate in priority (in respect of claims
against ships) to maritime liens and marine mortgages. In Gulf Coast Ma-
rine Ways Inc. v. The J.R. Hardee, the Court said:
Since the Government's tax lien is non-maritime, I do not believe that it
has priority, even though notice is filed pursuant to a state statute, over
maritime liens in general, certainly not over the preferred maritime liens
created under the Ship Mortgage Act. Congress has evidenced no clear
intention to give it such status.' 52
Similarly, in United States v. Barge Cape Flattery I, it was stated:
The tax lien of Clallam County is non-maritime and, as such, is not en-
titled to participate in the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the
Defendant vessel before payment of all known and existing preferred
maritime liens.' 53
The American cases are summarized in Gilmore and Black, Admiralty
Law "'54 as follows:
Since the early 1950's the lower federal courts have, without exception,
held, in the relatively few cases that have arisen, that federal, state and lo-
cal [tax] claims, being nonmaritime, are subordinate to all maritime liens
(including the lien of a preferred ship mortgage) whether the maritime
liens arise before or after the governmental claim becomes entitled to lien
status or priority under the relevant state or federal law.
151. Ibid at 212.
152. 107 F. Supp. 379 at 385 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
153. 1972 A.M.C. 345 at 348 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
154. Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr. The Law ofAdmiralty, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation
Press, 1975) at 758.
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Gilmore and Black make the point, which seems to be a valid one, that
Congress in the United States had the power and "could perfectly well
have conferred marine lien status on tax claims against ships and ship
owners." Having not done so, it can reasonably be presumed that Congress
did not intend to subordinate maritime liens and ship mortgages to general
tax liens.
While there appears to be no Canadian case on point, the reasoning in
the American cases and authorities that have considered the status of tax
liens in the United States in the context of maritime law appears sound.
Many of the American authorities were in fact cited by the Federal Court
of Canada in Winder, albeit in the context of considering the status of a
provincial statutory lien claim under the British Columbia Workers Com-
pensation Act.
There is, of course, no question that the federal Parliament of Canada
has the authority to confer preferential status, in the context of maritime
law claims, on the statutory liens relating to taxes under the Income Tax
Act and Excise Tax Act and federal crown royalty obligations. Parliament
has not exercised that authority - at least not explicitly.
Absent express statutory provisions to the contrary, it seems likely that
federal statutory liens will not be considered as having any preferential
status such as would alter the long established ranking of priorities of
claims under maritime law.
Conclusion
With the exception of Newfoundland's Bills of Sale Act,'55 Conditional
Sales Act'56 and Assignment of Book Debts Act'5 7 (all of which have now
been repealed and replaced by the province's Personal Property Security
Act),'58 none of the provincial laws of Nova Scotia or Newfoundland have
been extended to the offshore areas to date. In the context of offshore ac-
tivities that are undertaken on or in respect of "ships" (including floating
barges, semi-submersible oil rigs, jack-ups, and floating production, stor-
age and offloading vessels), the absence of any applicable provincial labour
standards or workers' compensation legislation should not be regarded as
particularly significant. Activities on ships are governed by maritime law.
Maritime law has developed its own set of rules to protect the wage claims
155. Supra note 40.
156. Supra note 41.
157. Supra note 39.
158. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 13.
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of individuals who work on ships and to protect the claims of contractors
and suppliers who construct, repair, maintain or furnish goods or services
to ships and vessels. That system has evolved over a considerable period
of time and seems to continue to be reasonably effective. Maritime law is
a body of federal law. It is seen as important that the law is uniform across
the country. The imposition of provincial statutes into maritime law would
disturb well-established priority rankings of claims against ships and
could jeopardize the requirement for uniformity of maritime law across
the country since provincial laws will vary from province to province.
The more difficult questions relate to the status of permanent offshore
marine facilities such as pipelines or permanent production platforms.
Those types of facilities would not be considered to be ships under Cana-
dian maritime law since they lack the ability to move or be moved from
one place to another. Cases in the United States have held that such facili-
ties are not ships.
What law should apply to activities undertaken on or in respect of such
facilities? Under the Oceans Act,'59 federal laws will apply to offshore
marine installations and structures on the continental shelf. The problem
is that there is no comprehensive body of federal law dealing with matters
of property and civil rights, since those matters are under provincial juris-
diction pursuant to section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. For instance,
there is no federal personal property security legislation. What are the
rights of labourers who work on such facilities in respect of wage claims?
Should workers compensation legislation apply to activities undertaken
on those facilities? What are the rights of contractors and suppliers who
construct, repair or maintain such facilities? How does one take and en-
force security interests on such assets? How would the rights of secured
creditors rank in relation to other claims? These questions, or the absence
of any definitive answers to them, suggest that appropriate legislative in-
tervention is required. Without it, there will remain a great deal of uncer-
tainty as to the legal rights, remedies and respective priorities of claims of
those engaged in activities relating to permanent offshore production and
processing facilities.
159. Supra note 28.

